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The Right to Know … Or Not: The Freedom of Information Act,
1955-1974
Tommy C. Brown
Introduction
In May 2014, the executive council of the Society of
American Archivists (SAA) adopted a resolution prepared by the
Committee on Advocacy and Public Policy detailing the
organization’s official position regarding the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). By supporting "all efforts to strengthen the federal
Freedom of Information Act," the council drew attention to a number
of loopholes within the law that effectively limited the public’s
access to government records. According to the resolution, after
decades of litigation and numerous amendments to the original
FOIA, federal agencies continue to resist the law’s full
implementation, interpret the exemption provisions far too broadly,
and fail to produce requested materials in a timely manner – agencies
often ignore FOIA requests altogether while sometimes taking
months or even years to answer requests. Moreover, presidents have
routinely weakened the law through Executive Orders while
executive departments find new and inventive ways to stonewall or
clog up the entire process.1 The public’s "right to know" increasingly
falls victim to what former SAA president Timothy Ericson once
referred to as the "Iron Curtain" of governmental secrecy.2
Five months after adopting the FOIA resolution, SAA joined
the American Library Association and dozens of FOIA advocacy
groups in an open letter to President Barack Obama, urging the
president to take a more active role in proposing legislation that
would codify much-needed changes to strengthen the law.3 Since the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, the
1

“Society of American Archivists Council Meeting Minutes, May 22–24, 2014,
Chicago, Illinois,” http://www2.archivists.org/sites/all/files/0514Minutes_adopted%207-15-14.pdf.
2
Timothy L. Ericson, “Building Our Own ‘Iron Curtain’: The Emergence of
Secrecy in American Government,” American Archivist 68, no. 1 (Spring/Summer
2005): 18–52.
3
“Coalition Letter to President Obama on FOIA Reforms,”
http://www.commoncause.org/policy-and-litigation/letters-to-governmentofficials/coalition-letter-to-president.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/.
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government has taken unprecedented steps curtailing access to
information, a move roundly criticized by transparency advocates
including many in the archival community. And despite some initial
success undoing the damage of his predecessor, Barack Obama has
in recent years been less than enthusiastic fulfilling his own 2009
directive that "all agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of
disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to the principles
embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open Government."4
Ironically, the White House announced on March 16, 2015 (a day
celebrated annually as Freedom of Information Day), that the Office
of Administration would no longer subject itself to FOIA requests, a
rule originally adopted by the Bush Administration. The Associated
Press subsequently accused the administration of setting new records
"for censoring government files or outright denying access to them . .
. under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act."5
For archivists and other transparency advocates,
understanding the history of the Freedom of Information Act may
shed light on recent events and why efforts to maintain open records
and strengthen the FOIA continue regardless of which political party
occupies the White House. Few people in the archival community
would disagree that the FOIA and all of the various state and local
sunshine laws enacted over the past century have strengthened
democratic governance throughout the country. Yet, as Timothy
Ericson asked in his presidential address to the SAA in 2004, "why
have [archivists] not been more zealous in embracing our ethical
responsibility to ‘discourage unreasonable restrictions on access’
with respect to government records that are being unreasonably
restricted by the millions?"6 To be sure, the organization’s efforts
over the past several years highlighting the FOIA’s deficiencies and
advocating for revisions have in part addressed Ericson’s question,
but much remains to be done.
4

U.S. President, Memorandum, “Memorandum of January 21, 2009, Freedom of
Information Act,” Federal Register 74, no. 15 (January 26, 2009): 4683.
5
U.S. President, Rules and Regulations, “Removal of Published Rules to Align
Published Policy with Current Sources of Law,” Federal Register 80 no. 51
(March 17, 2015): 13757; Associated Press, “Obama Administration Sets New
Record for Withholding FOIA Requests,” PBS Newshour Rundown, March 18,
2015, http://www.pbs.org.
6
Ericson, “Building Our Own Iron Curtin,” 21.
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This article explores the early history of the Freedom of
Information Act from the establishment of the Special Subcommittee
on Government Information in 1955 to the amendments added in the
wake of the Watergate scandal in 1974. It argues that, from the
beginning, executive departments and federal agencies took full
advantage of the various exemptions within the law to shield
themselves from prying eyes, a precedent that continues to this day.
It also looks at the ways in which large companies attempted to use
the act to gain competitive advantages in the marketplace. Indeed,
despite congressional intent, it was largely the business world and
not necessarily the average citizen or the press that routinely sued the
government for access to information. Finally, it suggests that federal
courts more often than not ruled in favor of openness when it came
to FOIA cases. The courts made a concerted effort to balance the
public’s right to know with the need for security, privacy, and
confidentiality. Yet, in a handful of important cases, the courts
handed down decisions that effectively gutted portions of the law,
prompting Congress to move forward with amendments to
circumvent these verdicts. In view of the fact that 2016 marks the
FOIA’s 50th anniversary, this study will hopefully be a timely
reminder of the law’s significance and the important role that
archivists play in advocating for open records at all levels of
government. It is also a reminder that "open records," "freedom of
information," and "public records" are not just theoretical
expressions used by archivists who work with records at the national
level. For nearly five decades the FOIA has influenced, both directly
and indirectly, state and local legislation that affects archivists
throughout the United States.
Early History of the FOIA, 1953–1966
In 1953, attorney and open records advocate Harold Cross
wrote: "Public Business is the public’s business. The people have the
right to know. Freedom of information is their just heritage. Without
that the citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings." Cross
argued that through a series of executive orders, departmental rules
and regulations, and various legal statutes "the Executive
Departments and the administrative agencies have been enabled to
assert the power to withhold practically all information they do not
see fit to disclose." His research and subsequent book on government
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records and public access – sanctioned by and presented as a report
to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) – is often
credited for laying the groundwork for the Freedom of Information
Act.7
In the years immediately following the end of World War II,
most Americans expected the government’s unprecedented war-time
secrecy operations to diminish as Europe and Asia entered into a
post-war rebuilding phase. Yet, with the onset of the nuclear age and
the ensuing Cold War, a wave of anti-communist sentiment washed
over the nation, engulfing millions of Americans who feared
increasingly the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. The nation’s
national security apparatus thus began a whole new phase of secrecy
and censorship as Republican and Democratic administrations
worked to protect the nation’s military secrets and clamp down on
information leaks. Harry Truman issued several executive orders to
this effect during his presidency, including a 1951 directive that
placed new restrictions on the flow of government information.
Three years later, the Eisenhower Administration created the Office
of Strategic Information (OSI), a move widely criticized by the
ASNE and other news organizations. The OSI worked to protect the
nation’s scientific, industrial, and economic information, and protect
such information from falling into the hands of individuals or
organizations that might threaten national security. During the 1950s
and early 1960s, government agencies additionally created over 30
information classifications, including the popular "Official Use
Only" and "Confidential" stamps often used to protect information.
According to Harold Cross, "never before in our national history has
Presidential power been asserted in terms so all embracing."8
In the wake of such unprecedented levels of secrecy, control,
and suppression of federal records, the ASNE’s Freedom of
Information Committee worked diligently compiling information,
7

Harold L. Cross, The People’s Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records
and Proceedings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), xiii, 230–231.
8
“Editors for Easing Truman News Ban,” New York Times, November 16, 1952;
“Agencies Defend Information Bar,” New York Times, November 3, 1955;
“Congress Urged to Curb Secrecy,” New York Times, December 18, 1955; Herbert
N. Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know: The Origins and
Applications of the Freedom of Information Act (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press,
1999), 19.
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educating member editors, and combatting government secrecy.
Committee chair James Pope criticized federal regulations that
closed off information and insulated federal departments from
outside scrutiny. "Almost all the administrative news of our
Government is so controlled," he observed. "Departmental records
have been put into a privileged, quasi-confidential status under which
there is no press or public inspection as a matter of right." During the
1950s, using Cross’s research to build and present their case, the
committee actively engaged members of Congress and successfully
recruited a number of influential politicians, including Democratic
congressman John E. Moss from California.9
As chair of the congressional Special Subcommittee on
Government Information (commonly known as the Moss
Subcommittee), Moss quickly became the leading advocate for
legislative solutions to limitless government secrecy and the
executive suppression of millions of federal records unrelated to
national security. To illustrate the absurdity, he once penned an
article for the New York Times in which he criticized various
executive departments for invoking the 1789 "Housekeeping Law" as
an excuse for withholding government documents. "Congress never
intended – nor did President Washington request – a law permitting
federal officials to put the padlock of secrecy on public information
about the operations of Government," Moss argued.10 In 1958, in the
face of opposition from every executive department of the
presidency, Congress amended the Housekeeping Law by adding one
sentence to the original language: "this section does not authorize
withholding information from the public or limiting the availability

9

Herbert N. Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know: The Origins
and Applications of the Freedom of Information Act (Westport, CT.: Greenwood
Press, 1999), 17–18.
10
John E. Moss, “Anti-Secrecy Law is Hailed by Moss: Californian Calls
Amending of 1789 Act an Advance in the Right to Know,” New York Times,
August 17, 1958. Title IV, Executive Departments, Section 161, otherwise known
as the “Housekeeping Law,” states simply: “The head of each Department is
authorized to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law, for the government of
his Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and
performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records,
papers, and property appertaining to it.”
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of records to the public."11 President Dwight Eisenhower reluctantly
signed the bill but insisted that the executive branch retained inherent
powers under the Constitution to withhold information critical to the
public interest.12
In addition to amending the Housekeeping Law, the Moss
Subcommittee proposed amendments to the Administrative
Procedure Act, originally adopted in 1946 to establish a uniform set
of procedural standards for federal administrative agencies to follow.
Despite specific language directing agencies to publish their rules,
opinions, orders, and public records, many refused to do so, citing
provisions within the law that allegedly protected government
documents held in the "public interest" as well as information related
to agencies’ internal management. The Federal Aviation
Administration, for instance, refused to release taped recordings of
conversations between pilots and air traffic controllers recorded
during major aircraft accidents, even though the agency routinely
published edited transcripts of these tragic last-minute exchanges.
The U.S. Army similarly denied requests from various news
organizations for testimony transcripts related to hearings and courtsmartial, even though the trials themselves were open to the public.
The Atomic Energy Commission refused to release photographs of
the two atomic bombs used by the United States against Japan during
World War II for fear that doing so would attract "worldwide
repercussions." The Department of Defense rejected requests to
make public a study of the nation’s air raid warning system,
ostensibly because doing so might embarrass various governmental
agencies in charge of the program. Dozens of similar examples
seemed to confirm what many feared; that withholding information
from the public had become more or less routine practice within the
federal bureaucracy.13
Moss condemned what he believed to be flagrant violations
11

An Act to Amend Section 161 of the Revised Statutes With Respect to the
Authority of Federal Officers and Agencies to Withhold Information and Limit the
Availability of Records, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (August 12, 1958).
12
“Eisenhower Signs Information Bill,” New York Times, August 15, 1958.
13
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 88th Cong. 9–12 (October
28, 1964) (statement of Earl F. English, Dean, School of Journalism, University of
Missouri).
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of both the spirit and the letter of the law. "Federal agencies," he
argued, "have seized on certain words or phrases in the law to keep
information secret, not only from the public but from Congress. This
is a tortured interpretation of a law intended to make information
available."14 Even with the addition of new amendments, the
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations continued to
take advantage of loopholes within the system.
By 1965, as the Moss Subcommittee continued its mission for
greater public access to government information, it became clear that
minor changes to existing laws would never provide adequate
safeguards against an overly zealous bureaucracy bent on censorship
and secrecy. By this time, even the most innocuous items, such as
telephone directories published by the Department of the Navy,
remained off-limits to the public. At one point the Postmaster
General decided that the names and salaries of postal employees
were equally outside the purview of the general public. And the
Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors decided not to release
their board minutes, which included valuable information related to
contract awards.15
Legislation soon to become the Freedom of Information Act
accelerated in Congress after Moss gained a number of Republican
cosponsors, including second-term congressman Donald Rumsfeld
who became one of the act’s most passionate supporters. Major
newspaper outlets such as the Washington Post campaigned in favor
of the law’s passage: "The principles it involves have been
extensively debated for the last decade … Its great contribution to
the law is its express acknowledgement that citizens may resort to
the courts to compel disclosure where withholding violates the

14

Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know, 35–37; Administrative
Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 79th Congress (1946); “Congress Asked to
Curb Secrecy,” New York Times, April 25, 1957.
15
It should be noted that Moss and other members of congress, primarily
Democrats, had for years supported a tough, comprehensive pubic records law, but
executive branch opposition coupled with resistance from prominent legislators in
both parties killed those attempts. Indeed, in the early 1960s, there were even
efforts to defund or completely abolish the committee altogether. Michael R.
Lemov, People’s Warrior: John Moss and the Fight for Freedom of Information
and Consumer Rights (Madison, NJ.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011),
59–60.
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law."16 With a wave of press support and a massive amount of
political wrangling between the House and Senate versions of the
bill, Moss finally accomplished the task that he had been working
toward for over a decade. Lyndon Johnson was reluctant to sign the
bill into law, however, waiting until the last possible moment to do
so. Indeed, Johnson’s press secretary at the time, Bill Moyers, later
claimed that "LBJ had to be dragged, kicking and screaming, to the
signing ceremony. He hated the very idea of open government, hated
the thought of journalists rummaging in government closets. He dug
in his heels and even threatened to pocket veto the bill."17 Despite
serious reservations concerning the new legislation, which the
president laid out in a press release several days after the event,
Johnson nevertheless signed the bill into law on Independence Day,
1966.
The FOIA amended section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, directing executive agencies to disclose identifiable
records upon request unless such records fell within one or more of
nine specific exemptions.18 For the first time, Congress devised a
mechanism whereby "any person" – a distinct departure from the
historical model restricting access to everyone except those "properly
and directly concerned" with government business – could obtain
information generated by the executive branch, with provisions for
judicial review should agencies deny access to their records.19 In a
16

Washington Post editorial quoted in Lemov, People’s Warrior, 61.
Bill Moyers quoted in Lemov, People’s Warrior, 67.
18
The FOIA exempted all information “(1) specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy; (2)
related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency; (3)
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and commercial
or financial information obtained from any person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a private party; (8)
contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of any agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical
information and data (including maps) concerning wells.”
19
An Act to Amend Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No.
89-487 (July 4, 1966). See also, Dwayne Cox, “Title Company v. County
17
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memorandum to the various departments and agencies, Attorney
General Ramsey Clark noted that the new law "leaves no doubt that
disclosure is a transcendent goal, yielding only to such compelling
considerations as those provided for in the exemptions of the act."
Clark’s directive bolstered congressional intent by insisting that the
government could no longer operate under an assumption of secrecy;
the impetus for withholding records now fell upon the agencies
themselves. Predictably, executive agencies began the process of
nondisclosure almost immediately, interpreting the exemption
clauses as broadly as possible, using them as shields against the free
flow of information. The attorney general’s insistence "that there be
a change in government policy and attitude" did not always take root
in the bureaucracy, leading to a whole new era of litigation.20
Despite Congress’s intentions to the contrary, the exemption
provisions armed the government with nine newly-codified excuses
for withholding information. It became increasingly clear that within
the first few years after the law’s implementation the Freedom of
Information Act had quickly turned into the freedom from
information act. Even so, the judicial review provision of the FOIA
paved the way for citizens and organizations to challenge the
government in court for unlawfully restricting the free flow of
information. From 1966 to 1974, the bulk of the legal action
surrounding the new law largely revolved around four of the nine
exemptions: executive privilege (1), trade secrets (4), internal
memoranda (5), and investigatory files (7). In the eight years
following the law’s implementation approximately half of the FOIA
cases filed in federal courts involved these four exemptions.21
Executive Privilege
The idea of executive privilege is as old as the common law
itself, dating back in the United States to the first Washington
Administration. During the 1796 debate over the Jay Treaty, for
Recorder: A Case Study in Open Records Litigation, 1874–1918,” American
Archivist 67, no. 1 (January 2004): 46–57.
20
Ramsey Clark, Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information
Section of the Administrative Procedure Act (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), iii.
21
Freedom of Information Act Source Book: Legislative Materials, Cases, Articles
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 120–123.
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instance, George Washington refused to disclose treaty documents to
members of the House of Representatives citing the need for secrecy
and the constitutional provision that only the Senate had the power to
ratify treaties. Every president since Washington has utilized the
concept, some much more than others.22 Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the executive branch frequently construed the phrase
"in the public interest" to mean whatever the government wanted
when it came to executive privilege. During the FOIA debate, a
report from the Congressional Committee on Government
Operations noted sarcastically: "No government employee at any
level believes that the "public interest" would be served by disclosure
of his failures or wrongdoings, but citizens . . . can agree to
restrictions on categories of information which the President has
determined must be kept secret to protect the national defense or to
advance foreign policy." The FOIA attempted to limit this language
by specifying that information could only be restricted by executive
order in matters specifically related to secrecy and national defense.23
One of the first court challenges to the executive privilege
exemption came in 1967 when Julius Epstein, a journalist and
research associate at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, sued
the Secretary of the Army over access to records regarding Operation
22

Jerald Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 176–177. There are many
examples of executive privilege. During the congressional investigation of the
Aaron Burr conspiracy, Thomas Jefferson refused to turn over personal letters that
he believed would compromise confidential informants. Andrew Jackson later
declined to hand over a copy of a presentation he had made during a cabinet
meeting outlining his reasons for withdrawing federal funds from the Bank of the
United States. Theodore Roosevelt once removed records related to the federal
Bureau of Corporations from a government office building, transported them to the
White House, and challenged the Senate, who had requested to see the items, to
come over and retrieve them. “The only way the Senate . . . can get these papers
now is through my impeachment,” he reportedly declared. See Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 44–
47, 84.
23
Clarifying and Protecting the Right of the Public to Information, H.R. Rep. No.
1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). In recent decades, both the Bush and Obama
Administrations have arguably pushed the limits of this provision. From the
wiretapping and enhanced interrogation controversies under Bush, to current
debates involving Operation Fast and Furious and the Benghazi attack under
Obama, both presidents have used the national security provisions in the FOIA to
shield their administrations from public scrutiny.
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Keelhaul, the forced repatriation of anti-communist Soviet citizens
following World War II. These files, originally created by Allied
Force Headquarters and classified top secret, resided in the U.S.
Army archives for years until relocated to the National Archives and
Records Service, General Services Administration (now the National
Archives and Records Administration or NARA) sometime during
the late 1950s. The district court and the court of appeals supported
the government’s rejection of Epstein’s petition for access. By
refusing to hear the case, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially upheld
the appeals court decision. Although the opinions are couched in
legal language consistent with the courts’ interpretation of the
FOIA’s deference to the executive branch in matters related to
secrecy, foreign policy, and national defense, the evidence suggests
that in this case the judiciary was particularly cognizant of Cold War
realities. Even though the documents in question were more than 20
years old, there was no need to release information that may further
complicate foreign relations (or in light of the Vietnam debacle, give
the government yet another black eye in foreign policy). Epstein
pointedly criticized the ruling, especially the courts’ decision not to
invoke an in-camera review of the files: "the courts found that they
had not the power to subpoena the documents and that classification
was ‘appropriate.’ How they could decide that classification of about
300 documents was appropriate without having seen a single one, is
hard to explain." To be sure, the judiciary’s interpretation of the
executive privilege exemption in Epstein appears to have been in
direct conflict with congressional intent that the courts utilize the
"broadest latitude" when examining cases related to secret
documents.24
The issue of in-camera inspection came up again in a
landmark case that Representative Patsy Mink from Hawaii once
described as the "Waterloo of the Freedom of Information Act." In
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 32 members of Congress
joined her in a request to inspect documents related to an
underground nuclear test scheduled to take place on Amchitka Island
in Alaska. Mink and other critics of nuclear testing in the Pacific
Ocean believed that such powerful blasts along seismically active
24

Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (1969); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F. 2d 930
(1970); Epstein v. Resor, 398 U.S. 965, 90 S. Ct. 2176 (1970); Julius Epstein, “A
Case for Suppression,” New York Times, December 18, 1970.
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zones threatened to set off earthquakes that could potentially create
deadly tsunamis in the region.25 The Cannikin Papers (reflecting the
operation’s code-name) included about nine items, some classified
top-secret, which served as an administrative review of the proposed
test. The Richard Nixon Administration rejected Mink’s request:
"These recommendations were prepared for the advice of the
President and involve highly sensitive matter that is vital to our
national defense and foreign policy."26 While the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia sided with the president, the appeals
court reversed that decision. The executive cannot classify an entire
file top secret when only a few documents actually fit that
description. The appeals court ordered the district judge to inspect
the file in-camera to determine which documents should be properly
disclosed. The EPA appealed and the case soon became one of the
Supreme Court’s most important, yet widely-criticized, FOIA
cases.27
In an extraordinarily broad interpretation of the executive
privilege exemption, the high court’s 5-3 ruling effectively banned
the lower courts from conducting in-camera inspections of materials
classified top-secret by the executive branch. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Potter Stewart shifted the blame to the legislature,
insisting that Congress "has built into the Freedom of Information
Act an exemption that provides no means to question an Executive
decision to stamp a document ‘secret,’ however cynical, myopic, or
even corrupt that decision might have been."28 Justice William
Douglas countered that the court’s ruling not only misconstrued
congressional intent, but in effect nullified the FOIA when it came to
just about anything the executive branch wished to label top secret.
"The majority makes the stamp sacrosanct," he argued, "thereby
immunizing stamped documents from judicial scrutiny … The
Executive Branch now has carte blanche to insulate information from
25

Despite the controversy, the government conducted the test on November 6,
1971, without incident. The Mink case, however, continued through the federal
court dockets for several years after the test.
26
John W. Dean to Patsy T. Mink, July 30, 1971. Patsy T. Mink Papers, Library of
Congress, Washington D.C.,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/images/mink_dean_smst.jpg.
27
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, Civil Action No. 1614-71 (1971);
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 464 F. 2d 742 (1971).
28
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827 (1973).
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public scrutiny whether or not that information bears any discernible
relation to the interest sought to be protected" by the executive
privilege exemption.29
Patsy Mink later described the court’s ruling as a "fabricated
interpretation of the Act." By removing the "public interest" wording
from the Administrative Procedure Act, she noted, Congress clearly
wished to change the way the executive handled information,
including top secret documents. Why then would the legislature, in
passing the FOIA, replace one ineffective statute with another
allowing the executive branch to continue along the same path as
before? If the court is correct in its ruling, she observed, then
"Congress declared that any document – for example, the Manhattan
telephone directory or the Encyclopedia Britannica – could be
classified ‘Top Secret’ by being so stamped by any of the army of
federal employees authorized to classify documents under authority
of the general Executive Order."30 Although the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mink dealt a serious blow to proponents of the FOIA, it
triggered an immediate response from members of Congress who
wished to overrule the court’s decision, strengthen the law, and close
the loopholes. Congress amended the law in 1974 specifically to
address these issues.
Trade Secrets
In the 1965 legislation, Congress added an exemption for
trade secrets specifically to protect confidential business and
commercial information obtained by the government from
inadvertently or purposely falling into the hands of competitors or
the public. Should the Food and Drug Administration, for example,
collect information related to Kentucky Fried Chicken’s special spice
mix for Colonel Sander’s Original Recipe, the trade secrets provision
was designed to protect these types of closely-guarded secrets. Yet,
despite congressional intent and the seemingly plain language of the
law, the government often applied this exemption erroneously.
29

Ibid; “Justices Back Full Secrecy of Documents on Security,” New York Times,
January 23, 1973.
30
Patsy T. Mink, “The Mink Case: Restoring the Freedom of Information Act,”
Pepperdine Law Review 1, vol. 2 (December 1974): 18,
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2241&context=
plr.
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In Benson v. General Services Administration, for instance,
the GSA denied Henry Benson’s request for documents pertaining to
Auburn Industrial Center’s purchase of real estate previously owned
by the government. Benson argued that the Industrial Center, in
which he was a partner, needed the information for clarification
purposes in order to address an IRS inquiry into the transaction.
Citing the trade secrets exemption, GSA insisted that the records
contained confidential and privileged financial information and were
therefore closed to public inspection. The U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington disagreed, ruling that all of the
requested documentation, with the exception of an outside credit
report, should be disclosed to Benson. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit later affirmed the lower court’s decision. Both
courts agreed that since almost all of the information was directly
related to Auburn Industrial Center, the GSA had no legal grounds
under the FOIA to withhold the documents.31
In a similar ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia granted Grumman Aircraft Corporation’s request to
review orders and opinions issued by the government Renegotiation
Board, despite the Board’s insistence that the documents contained
confidential information protected by the trade secrets exemption.
The Board held extraordinary power over companies with
government contracts, including the authority to demand that
Grumman repay millions of dollars in excess profits from one of its
fighter aircraft projects. Grumman’s attorneys insisted that
undisclosed government documents would help prove their case. The
appeals court suggested that the Board redact confidential
information but otherwise ordered the release of all requested
documents. Writing for the majority, Judge David Bazelon insisted
that, "in the future, the Board can avoid the problem by deleting
identifying details from each opinion or order and then making it
available to public inspection as a matter of course."32 In both

31

Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (1968); General
Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (1969).
32
Grumman Aircraft v. Renegotiation Board, 425 F. 2d 578; 138 U.S. App. D.C.
147 (1970). Judge David Bazelon is recognized as one of law’s most important
judicial proponents. More often than not he interpreted the language of the law
broadly and the nine exemptions narrowly. See Victor Kramer and David

The Right to Know … Or Not

107

Benson and Grumman, the courts ruled strongly in favor of
disclosure even if it meant additional headaches for government
departments in terms of time and manpower spent redacting
information or otherwise preparing documents for public release.33
Although the government eventually released a host of documents
related to the national board, Grumman insisted that it make all
information available, including documentation from local and
regional boards. At this point the Supreme Court ruled that local and
regional board decisions were not permanent decisions and were
therefore protected by the internal memoranda exemption of the
FOIA.34
In cases involving the trade secrets exemption, the judiciary
attempted to balance the people’s right to know with the
government’s responsibility to maintain confidentiality. Because the
FOIA statute never adequately defined the term "confidential" the
courts were forced to come up with a working definition of their
own. By examining both case law and the congressional record the
courts generally agreed that information placing government
contractors at a competitive disadvantage or creating an atmosphere
of distrust that threatened to derail future projects would be
considered confidential.35 Yet, despite this understanding, the courts
did not always see eye to eye in their application. In Petkas v. Staats,
for instance, the D.C. District Court upheld the government’s CostAccounting Standards Board in their decision to deny access to
Weinberg, “The Freedom of Information Act,” Georgetown Law Journal 63, no. 1
(October 1974): 49–67.
33
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34
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financial disclosure statements previously submitted by Lockheed
Aircraft and three other major American corporations. The court
conducted an in-camera inspection of the documents in question and
concluded that the data contained sensitive and confidential
information. The appeals court, however, reversed and remanded the
decision, insisting that the district court reconsider whether
disclosure would indeed hinder the government’s future ability to
obtain needed information or substantially harm the companies’
competitive position. If not, the board should release Lockheed’s
financial statements.36
From cost analyses to employment procedures and project
details, federal law requires government contractors to submit all
manner of information documenting their business and hiring
practices. Once the FOIA went into effect, companies began using
the trade secrets exemption as well as other provisions in the law to
prevent federal agencies from disclosing these reports to the public.
These "reverse FOIA suits," as they have often been called, are those
in which the "submitter of information – usually a corporation or
other business entity, that has supplied an agency with data on its
policies, operations, or products – seeks to prevent the agency that
collected the information from revealing it to a third party in
response to the latter’s FOIA request."37 In such cases, as the
argument goes, the law requires the government to withhold the
information. As a government defense contractor, for instance,
Hughes Aircraft Company submitted affirmative action plans to the
Department of Labor. The reports purportedly contained confidential
information related to minority hiring, firing, and promotion
practices. When the National Organization for Women filed a FOIA
request to inspect Hughes’s 1974 plan for the Culver City Plant, the
company cried foul, insisting that the plan fell under the trade secrets
exemption. Disclosure would reveal labor costs, they argued,
allowing competitors to calculate profit margins and underbid
Hughes on future contracts. The U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California found that Hughes’s affirmative action plan had
only "marginal utility … to a competitor." Moreover, Hughes and
36
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other aircraft manufacturers routinely shared wage and salary
information with one another, thus undercutting the entire premise of
the company’s case. The court concluded that Hughes was
apparently "more concerned about embarrassment" than it was about
its competitors gaining a competitive edge as contractors.38
In a similar reverse FOIA case, Sears, Roebuck, and
Company sued the General Services Administration to prevent
disclosure of its affirmative action plans and equal opportunity
documents. Sears contended that releasing the information would
allow other companies to calculate labor costs, expansion plans, and
sales volume, thus undermining their competitive position and
violating the trade secrets exemption. The D.C. District Court found
that Sears had produced no real evidence to support their assertions
and ordered the information released. Both Hughes and Sears
illustrate that in reverse FOIA cases involving the trade secrets
exemption, the courts often established a high bar for companies
attempting to prevent the government from disclosing their
information. Yet, the courts were not unsympathetic to those who
demonstrated a potential for real harm. After reviewing evidence and
hearing testimony from the Conference of National Park
Concessioners, for example, the D.C. Circuit Court agreed that
disclosing concessioner information would compromise their
competitiveness and damage their businesses. Experts testified that
because the Park Service required its concessioners to provide
detailed information related to assets, liabilities, net worth, cash
position, investments, accounts receivable, expenses, fixed assets,
and other highly sensitive business data, releasing such data would
undercut concessioners’ position within the market.
Internal Memoranda
While the trade secrets exemption of the FOIA proved to be a
useful tool for government agencies, individuals, and businesses
pursuing nondisclosure, the internal memoranda exemption (which
includes both inter-agency and intra-agency communications) often
provided even more room for bureaucratic mischief. Congress added
the exemption to protect the free flow of ideas within government
38
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agencies, safeguard the deliberative process from outside
interference, and prevent premature disclosure of rules and decisions
prior to finalization. Yet, federal agencies invoked the provision so
often that they found themselves subject to a flurry of litigation.
Judge David Bazelon, known widely for his support of the FOIA,
noted that the exemption "encourages the free exchange of ideas
among government policy makers, but it does not authorize an
agency to throw a protective blanket over all information by casting
it in the form of an internal memorandum."39
Bazelon also argued that internal memoranda could in fact be
subject to disclosure in cases where the government cited such
documentation as the sole evidence for taking action. In 1968, the
Maritime Subsidy Board ordered American Mail Line to refund
nearly $3.3 million in excess subsidy overpayments. As a branch
within the U.S. Maritime Administration, the Subsidy Board has the
power to demand repayment of subsidies considered to be fraudulent
or excessive. Although the board based its decision on a thirty-one
page memorandum prepared internally by board staff, it included
only the last five pages of the document in its official order. When
American Mail Line asked to inspect the full report the government
refused, citing the internal memoranda exemption of the FOIA. The
D.C. District Court initially ruled in the government’s favor, but the
Court of Appeals promptly reversed the decision. The court declared,
"the question which must be decided is whether an administrative
agency may take affirmative action against a private party by means
of a decision in which it states that the only basis for such action is a
certain specified memorandum and then refuse to disclose the
memorandum to the party affected by the action."40 In Gulick, the
actions of the Maritime Subsidy Board clearly violated the spirit, if
not the letter, of the internal memoranda exemption. Had the board’s
actions been allowed to stand, it would have sent a negative message
to every government contractor and business involved with federal
agencies.
The International Paper Company used the arguments in
Gulick as the basis for its FOIA lawsuit against the Federal Power
Commission (FPC). International wanted access to staff memoranda
39
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as well as other documentation related to FPC legal action and
regulatory decisions directly governing (and adversely affecting) the
paper company’s natural gas business. The Power Commission
denied the request and both the district court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the commission’s decision
for nondisclosure. The appeals court concluded that, unlike Gulick,
the memoranda sought in this case was not the sole basis for the
government’s decisions in its dealings with International, nor did
correspondence to and from FPC staffers qualify as final orders
subject to FOIA requests. The viewpoints of individual staff
members could be easily misconstrued or even "grossly misleading,
especially when applied to the ultimate findings and conclusions
reached by the FPC as a whole, because at best they are only
advisory in character."41
The courts in Gulick and International Paper established the
principle that "pre-decisional memoranda" not referenced in final
agency decisions would be exempt from disclosure, while
"decisional memoranda" would be accessible. The courts argued that
while the pre-decisional phase of the policymaking process is the
point at which adversarial views and opinions are expressed and
confidentiality required, the decisional phase reflects an agency’s
finished product and must be open to the public.42 Thus, the
government had an obligation to fulfill Freedom of Information
requests involving internal memoranda linked to federal agencies’
final decisions. Two Freedom of Information suits launched in the
early 1970s, Sterling Drug v. Federal Trade Commission and the
Grumman case mentioned previously, became perfect test cases for
this interpretation of the internal memoranda provision of the law.
In 1966, Sterling Drug acquired the Lehn & Fink company,
the maker of Lysol brand disinfectants and deodorizers. When the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) declared the acquisition a
violation of the Clayton Act, Sterling asked to inspect FTC records
regarding other similar acquisitions for use in its argument against
the commission – specifically those documents related to Miles
Laboratories’ (a competitor) successful acquisition of the S.O.S.
41
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Company.43 The FTC denied Sterling’s request, prompting the
company to launch a FOIA suit against one of the most powerful
agencies in Washington D.C. The district court initially ruled in
favor of the government, but the D.C. Court of Appeals divided the
sought-after information into three categories: documents prepared
by the commission staff, those prepared by individual commission
members, and those issued by the full commission. The court
declared all staff and commissioner communications to be predecisional and hence off limits to disclosure. Any documents or
portions of documents emanating from the commission as a whole,
however, must be disclosed to Sterling Drug. "These are not the
ideas and theories which go into the making of the law," the majority
opinion concluded, "they are the law itself, and as such should be
made available to the public." In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Bazelon questioned whether all of the documents in the first two
categories "need never be disclosed." The burden of proof should be
upon the FTC to demonstrate that every document, regardless of any
artificial categories, should be withheld from the public.44
In Grumman, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed an earlier
verdict by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that
decisions made by the Renegotiation Board’s regional offices were
considered final orders and thus available for public inspection. The
court accepted the government’s argument that opinions passed by
the regional boards were essentially "pre-decisional consultative
memoranda" subject to change or rejection by the national Board,
thus constituting internal memoranda. Simply put, the Freedom of
Information Act guaranteed the availability of final opinions issued
by government agencies, but the high court in this case determined
that regional reports were not final; only the national board could
issue final opinions. In a similar case, Wellford v. Hardin, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture denied Harrison Wellford’s request to
inspect bi-weekly reports of the Slaughter Inspection Division as
well as the minutes of the National Food Inspection Advisory
Committee. The USDA cited, among other provisions, the internal
memoranda exemption of the FOIA. The U.S. District Court for the
43
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District of Maryland initially ruled in favor of Wellford but later
reversed itself when Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin
produced additional documentation verifying, to the court’s
satisfaction at least, that the bi-weekly reports and committee
minutes were in fact opinion-based, pre-decisional documents that
qualified for non-disclosure.45
The courts in Gulick, Sterling Drug, Grumman, and Wellford
demonstrated a tendency to side with the government. Since the
FOIA was such a monumental departure from the way in which the
government usually operated, the courts were forced to interpret
several provisions largely from scratch. To be sure, congressional
intent regarding the internal memoranda exemption often proved
elusive and sometimes contradictory. Even Congressman Moss, who
argued that all documents related to agency decisions should be
disclosed once final action was taken on a matter, admitted that, "I
don’t think it possible at this time to go that far in drafting
language."46 Moreover, despite the judiciary’s overall attempt to err
on the side of openness whenever possible, the courts exhibited great
respect for administrative procedure when it came to the internal
workings of governmental agencies. Judges were mindful of their
role in protecting the bureaucracy’s need for internal policy debates
free from outside interference or fear that honest opinions may one
day end up in the hands of the media or be used in legal action
against individuals or agencies.
Investigatory Exemption
As it turned out, the internal memoranda exemption was the
only USDA argument the court accepted in the Wellford v. Hardin
decision. The bulk of the government’s case stemmed from the
USDA’s use of the investigatory exemption in the FOIA. This
provision quickly became one of the government’s favorite shields
against the free flow of information, and the courts weighed in
frequently to determine the legal bounds of this heavily litigated
exemption. The provision protects information related to federal law
enforcement endeavors by guarding against the disclosure of files
that would reveal the government’s investigatory methods and legal
45
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strategies. It also protects the identity of confidential sources, an
essential element in any investigation. Importantly, despite the
government’s abuse of the exemption, the courts attempted to
accommodate challengers whenever possible. In the Wellford
decision, for example, Harrison Wellford, Executive Director for the
Center for the Study of Responsive Law, requested copies of
warning letters previously sent by the USDA to non-federallyinspected meat and poultry processors suspected of engaging in
interstate commerce.47 Both the district court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals rejected the government’s contention that these records were
investigatory files on the grounds that the information had already
been delivered to the parties involved and would not interfere with
any ongoing investigations. The appeals court rejected the USDA’s
argument that releasing the reports would discourage non-federallyinspected meat and poultry plants from voluntarily complying with
federal guidelines. "The Freedom of Information Act was not
designed to increase administrative efficiency," the court reasoned,
"but to guarantee the public’s right to know how the government is
discharging its duty to protect the public interest."48
The courts, however, were careful to ensure federal agencies’
ability to carry out ongoing investigations and protect confidential
sources. In 1967, the Food and Allied Workers of Puerto Rico
accused Barceloneta Shoe Corporation of violating the Labor
Management Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) interviewed witnesses, Barceloneta asked to inspect these
records prior to the hearing, and the NLRB claimed that the records
fell under the investigatory files exemption and were therefore off
limits to disclosure during the investigation. The U.S. District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico agreed – premature disclosure could
hinder the government’s ability to collect information during future
47
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investigations.49 This reasoning proved especially true in cases
involving government informants. In 1971, Cowles
Communications, a multimedia news corporation, asked to inspect
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) files on Salvatore
Marino, a member of organized crime operating in San Jose,
California. Although the INS invoked the investigatory files
exemption, Cowles contended that the provision did not apply
because the government had no pending proceedings in the Marino
case. The district court ruled that disclosing such documents might
endanger informants, harm the government’s ability to investigate,
and violate personal privacy. On the other hand, the government
could not withhold the records by merely concluding that they fell
under the exemption. The court ultimately decided to conduct an incamera review of the documents in question and issue a ruling
accordingly.50
Both Barceloneta and Cowles demonstrate the courts were
particularly hesitant to release information related to ongoing
investigations, especially if that evidence would eventually become
available through the customary discovery process. The courts were
equally hesitant to release documents containing law enforcement
techniques or the various methods for gathering evidence. When the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicted Anthony Imbrunone for tax
evasion, the defendant asked to inspect portions of the manuals used
by the Audit Division in their investigation. Imbrunone considered
these documents administrative in nature, but the government
claimed they fell under the FOIA exemption for law enforcement
material. In a detailed affidavit, Singleton B. Wolfe, director of the
Audit Division of the IRS, explained that the manuals in question
contained "specific investigatory techniques and tolerances which
provide [IRS] personnel with an effective and efficient methodology
to be used in conjunction with their law enforcement efforts." The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan agreed with
the IRS.51
Not all of the cases involving law enforcement techniques
49
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were as straightforward as the Imbrunone case. In some instances the
courts applied this provision so broadly that it seemed to undermine
the whole purpose of the Freedom of Information Act. In 1971,
Frank Frankel and other stockholders of Occidental Petroleum
Corporation asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to inspect records of a recently-settled government investigation into
the company’s real estate business. The government’s case against
Occidental prompted the stockholders’ class action suit. After
multiple requests and waiting more than two months without a
response from the SEC, Frankel launched a FOIA suit against the
agency. While the SEC argued that the requested documents were
exempt as investigatory files, the district court ordered the files
released. On appeal, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling, contending that disclosure threatened to reveal
the agency’s investigatory techniques and procedures. In his dissent,
Judge James L. Oakes argued that the district court’s previous incamera inspection of the files should have been more than adequate
to dispense the investigatory argument and release the documents,
especially since the government’s case against Occidental had
already been settled. Indeed, it seems illogical that out of 7,000
documents related to the investigation, none apparently fit the circuit
court’s criteria for disclosure.52
The courts tended to be somewhat more balanced in cases
where the government invoked nondisclosure on inactive or pending
investigatory files that may or may not ever be used in any future
litigation. In the late 1960s the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) investigated reported incidents of off-board trading – the
purchase or sale of market securities by sidestepping the exchange.
M.A. Schapiro & Co., a large Wall Street investment brokerage,
asked to inspect the records accumulated during the course of the
investigation. When the SEC denied their request, the company filed
suit under the FOIA. The D.C. District Court ruled the records did
not fall under any of the four exemptions invoked by the
government. The investigatory files provision did not apply because
the SEC had no plans to pursue legal proceedings "within the
reasonably near future." The court noted that it had been six years
since the end of the investigation "and these documents have not
52
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been, nor is it alleged that they will be, the basis for either a criminal
or civil action against anyone."53 In a similar case, the D.C. District
Court supported Fred Black Jr.’s request to inspect FBI files
connected with an illegal 1964 surveillance operation conducted by
the agency against Black. Not only did the government admit that the
operation was not for law enforcement purposes, the court noted that
it had "been over ten years since the surveillance has been conducted,
and the [FBI] has not brought an action against [Black] and admits
all investigation for any possible action has been long since
concluded. Under these circumstances, the investigatory file
exemption is obviously not applicable."54
In all of these cases, and many more not included here,
government agencies consistently invoked the law
enforcement/investigatory exemption in their efforts to shield
themselves from the public’s prying eyes. The federal courts at every
level muddied the waters further by issuing conflicting rulings. Some
courts favored blanket exemptions for any and all records compiled
for law enforcement purposes, while others preferred a more narrow
interpretation that favored disclosure or partial disclosure. In any
event, the investigatory provision remained controversial and became
one of the areas of most concern when Congress began investigating
the FOIA’s effectiveness in the early 1970s and amended the law in
1974.
The 1974 Amendments
The federal government’s abuse of the four exemptions
presented in this study – executive privilege, trade secrets, internal
memoranda, and investigatory – was in many ways responsible for
Congress’s push to strengthen the law. In 1972, six years after the
enactment of the Freedom of Information Act, the congressional
Committee on Government Operations began the process of
interviewing witnesses, gathering facts, and presenting its case for
amending the original legislation. The report revealed that while
thousands of citizens had gained access to government information
through the new law, an entrenched culture of secrecy within the
executive branch continued to put up significant roadblocks. Federal
53
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agencies in both the Johnson and Nixon administrations developed
increasingly sophisticated techniques for evading disclosure. The
FOIA’s nine exemptions, designed to be narrowly-defined
exceptions to the rule, quickly became weapons in the government’s
fight against openness. In his testimony before Congress, Ralph
Nader concluded that government "officials at all levels . . . have
systematically and routinely violated both the purpose and specific
provisions of the law. These violations have become so regular and
cynical that they seriously block citizen understanding and
participation in government. Thus the Act, designed to provide
citizens with tools of disclosure, has been forged into a shield against
citizen access."55
A Congressional Research Service statistical analysis
conducted in 1972 at the behest of Congress documented a whole
host of "shortcomings," due primarily to bureaucratic resistance to
records disclosure. While some agencies furnished detailed data with
specific information, others submitted incomplete, distorted, or
otherwise unusable information. A few departments manipulated the
data by counting thousands of routine requests for information as
FOIA requests. The Department of the Air Force was "way out of
line" when it reported that it had received over 200,000 formal FOIA
requests, 170 percent more than the next highest number.
Conversely, the Civil Service Commission reported zero formal
requests, a clear indication that the agency either kept no records or
"apparently has no interest in implementing the law." Agencies
routinely cited multiple provisions within the law to deny access; the
nine exemptions proved to be especially popular in this regard. The
average response time for initial FOIA requests was approximately
33 days for all agencies, while the response time for appeals varied,
with the Small Business Administration averaging eight days and the
Department of Labor taking nearly four months. At least four
agencies "seem to be in no hurry to expedite requests for
information" under the FOIA. Even when individuals sued it
sometimes took years to gain access, and that is only in those cases
55

Administration of the Freedom of Information Act, Twenty-First Report by the
Committee on Government Operations Together with Additional Views, H.R. Rep.
No. 92-1419 (1972), 6–8; Ralph Nader, “Freedom of Information: The Act and the
Agencies,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 5, no. 1 (January
1970): 2.

The Right to Know … Or Not

119

where the government lost.56
Dozens of witnesses testified before the Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations and Government Information – chaired by
staunch FOIA advocate William S. Moorhead from Pennsylvania –
providing even more evidence for strengthening the act. Attorneys
for the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, for example,
explained the USDA’s "contamination tactic," one of many devices
designed to discourage freedom of access. When the Center asked to
inspect folders containing the records of nonfarm pesticide use, the
agency refused, claiming that the requested files were intermixed
with confidential documents that may disclose trade secrets. "It
would be too much work for our staff to read through all of the
correspondence to remove references to confidential information,"
one official responded. On its face this excuse may appear plausible
if not for the fact that the Center had already requested the same
documents two years prior, giving the government plenty of time to
rework the files. "The final straw," attorney Harrison Wellford noted,
"was when the USDA stated that if the information were made
available, it would cost $91,840 to prepare the registration files for
public viewing."57 In testimony after testimony, these kinds of tactics
appear to have been routine operating procedure for a number of
federal agencies and departments.
During the hearings, Congressman Moorhead expressed
disappointment that members of the press, who had been some of the
most outspoken advocates in favor of the original 1966 legislation,
were among the least likely to seek legal action against the
government. "After more than four years of operation," he observed,
"only a handful of newspapers … have actually invoked the
provisions of the act to the limit by going into the Federal courts to
fight for their first amendment rights."58 Ward Sinclair of the
56
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Louisville Courier-Journal responded that journalists must often
decide whether pursuing information in the face of uncooperative
agency officials is worth the time and effort, especially when the
pressure of meeting deadlines runs contrary to the government’s
tendency to drag things out for weeks or months at a time. On one
occasion, he explained, the Department of the Interior rejected
Sinclair’s written requests for copies of the Treleaven Project, a
costly project related to coal mining safety that the agency came
close to funding without any bids or alternative proposals. For four
months the department stonewalled, claiming that the report fell
under the internal memoranda provision, "hiding all the while behind
the Information Act." Their lawyers, Sinclair observed, "were able to
correctly surmise that it was not a document absolutely essential to
my work and they correctly guessed that it was not an issue that a
Kentucky newspaper was likely to go to court over."59
Another reporter, James B. Steele of the Philadelphia
Inquirer, testified about his investigation into the Philadelphia office
of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). He uncovered a
profiteering scheme where speculators purchased old, dilapidated
houses, made minimal, low-cost repairs, then sold the homes to poor
families at inflated prices, all with the blessings of the FHA. With
evidence suggesting a conspiracy between FHA staff, federal fee
appraisers, and speculators, Steele requested the names of the
appraisers and specific appraisal information. When the local office
rejected his initial request, the Inquirer submitted a formal FOIA
request to both the regional office of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the national office in Washington, D.C.
HUD secretary George Romney reluctantly released the names of the
appraisers but argued that the appraisals themselves were protected
by the interagency memoranda and investigatory exemptions of the
FOIA, a claim later rejected by the courts. Congressman John Moss,
who not only championed the original law but was also a licensed
real estate broker, voiced his opinion in no uncertain terms. "I think
this is about as outrageous a thing as I have heard," he remarked. "I
think it a perfect example of the outrageous attitude … within the
bureaucracy which grows ever more ominous in its desire to control
59
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what we know, think, and do." In his concluding remarks, Steele
testified that despite a court order some ten days earlier HUD had
still not released the documents.60
The subcommittee also heard testimony from Archivist of the
United States James B. Rhoads and Deputy Archivist James E.
O’Neill. To fulfill its dual role of caring for the nation’s non-current
records and making them available to the public, the National
Archives and Records Service operated fifteen Federal Records
Centers, six presidential libraries, and housed some 30 billion pages
of federal records. During the hearing, much of the testimony
revolved around the department’s efforts to manage and declassify
over 150 million classified documents, dating mostly from the World
War II era.61 Although both archivists explained the importance of
working with members of the intelligence community to accomplish
this task as quickly as possible without compromising military
secrets, committee members were bluntly skeptical about involving
other agencies in the decision-making process. Congressman
Moorhead summarized the committee’s position:
If this committee could do one thing, it is to urge you
to be on the side of the people’s right to know, be
there, advocate, prevail. I would like to see you have
the ultimate decisionmaking power at least for
documents past a certain age. It seems to me that the
Archives has a better grasp of that than do the
naturally secrecy-minded people of the CIA, or State
or Defense Departments. So I urge you to be strong
and tough and don’t let them maintain unnecessary
60
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secrecy.62
Under intense questioning, both archivists assured the committee of
their commitment to providing public access to the largest number of
documents possible, whether classified or not. As such, they argued,
their dedication to the Freedom of Information Act and the concept
of open records was solid.
Between 1972 and 1973, the subcommittee heard testimony
from nearly 200 witnesses including lawyers, journalists, newspaper
editors, citizen action groups, and representatives from every major
government agency and department. Ironically, more than a dozen
federal agencies revised their FOIA regulations just before or during
the course of the congressional hearings; two departments, the
Department of Labor and Department of Transportation, released
new regulations only hours before their representatives testified
before the subcommittee. Once testimonies ended, the Foreign
Operations and Government Information Subcommittee began
deliberation on a series of amendments to the FOIA. In 1974,
Congress enacted new rules to strengthen the Freedom of
Information Act.
Between the congressional hearings and the adoption of new
legislation in 1974, two important events helped to push the
amendments through. The Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink angered open records
advocates and surprised members of Congress. The court eliminated
in-camera review, effectively stripping the judiciary of its power in
handling FOIA requests on national defense and foreign policy
matters, thus giving the executive branch "carte blanche" in these
areas. It then blamed Congress for the law’s "unquestioning
deference to the Executive."63 Senator Edmund Muskie from Maine
took issue with the court’s suggestion that Congress was the culprit.
The whole point of the FOIA was to open access, not give the
executive more excuses for secrecy. "Obviously, something must be
done to correct this strained court interpretation," he argued. Why
should the American people trust a federal judge to deal
62
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appropriately with competing claims in the Watergate scandal "but
not trust him or his colleagues to make the same unfettered
judgements in matters allegedly connected to the conduct of defense
or foreign policy."64 Muskie’s reference to Watergate reveals the
second important event. The Watergate debacle simply reinforced an
already skeptical public’s view that the executive branch was out of
control. The actions of the Nixon Administration before, during, and
after the Watergate scandal motivated Congress to move more
quickly on the FOIA amendments. Along with the Mink decision,
Watergate created one of those rare perfect storms for getting things
done in Congress.
Both houses of Congress passed similar bills that were
eventually reconciled in conference. In October 1974, less than two
months after Nixon’s resignation from the presidency, the Senate
approved unanimously the FOIA conference report, with the House
following suit 349 to 2. President Gerald Ford, who had recently
pledged "an open and candid administration," promptly vetoed the
bill, insisting that the new amendments "would violate constitutional
principles, and give less weight before the courts to an executive
determination involving the protection of our most vital national
defense interests."65 Congressman Moorhead condemned the
president’s action and urged his colleagues in both houses to override
Ford’s veto. "Such unwarranted and illogical action," he argued,
coming just weeks after the president’s open government pledge
"forces us to recall all of the sordid happenings of his predecessor’s
administration that were first spawned and then covered up by abuses
of Government secrecy."66 While the vote in the Senate was much
closer than the original vote on passage, each house secured the
necessary two-thirds majorities to override the president’s veto. In
ordinary times such solidarity between the parties would be nearly
impossible, but the poisoned political atmosphere that existed
between the legislative and executive branches in the wake of the
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Watergate affair opened the door for a bipartisan override.
The amendments corrected a number of weaknesses in the
original law. First and foremost, Congress addressed its displeasure
with judicial interpretations of the executive privilege exemption (as
demonstrated in Mink) as well as the investigatory memoranda
provision. Indeed, the vast majority of congressional debate focused
on these two items. Congress narrowed the exemption for top secret
information to documents specifically designated by executive order
and properly classified as such. Importantly, it authorized the courts
to inspect files in-camera when necessary, and required agencies to
release any "reasonably segregable portion" of a file or document. As
far as the investigatory exemption is concerned, Congress wanted to
crack down on the government’s tendency to invoke nondisclosure
on entire files or folders, even when the majority of documents
within the files were unrelated to an investigation. Under the new
law, once an agency classified "records" (as opposed to the old
terminology "files") as investigatory, they must then meet at least
one of six new criteria to legally withhold the records from the
public.67 In other words, if the government could not prove that
releasing investigatory records would cause harm in one of the six
areas, then it was obliged to disclose the information.
The new amendments addressed several other issues
discussed during the congressional hearings. Congress imposed welldefined timetables by limiting agencies to ten working days to reply
to initial requests, twenty days to reply to appeals, with an additional
ten day allowance for unusual or unforeseen circumstances.68 The
67
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law required agencies to provide documents at no charge or a
reduced charge in cases where the information would benefit the
public as a whole. It also required government agencies and
departments to publish quarterly indexes and distribute or otherwise
make them available to the public at or below cost. Finally, Congress
added additional provisions for disciplining government personnel
who "acted arbitrarily or capriciously" in cases involving
nondisclosure.
While members of the Ford Administration predicted dire
consequences resulting from the new law’s implementation, no such
catastrophes ever materialized. Archivist Trudy Peterson observed in
1980 that despite some unforeseen consequences – which is to be
expected from any piece of legislation – the amended FOIA "is
working, releasing some information that the agencies would like to
withhold and withholding some information that requesters would
like released, probably striking a balance."69 Since 1974, the
Freedom of Information Act has been amended seven times, with
additional executive orders issued by Ronald Reagan, George W.
Bush, and Barack Obama also affecting the law’s standing. Requests
for information under the FOIA quadrupled in 1975 and the numbers
have continued to climb ever since. In 2014, federal agencies and
departments received over 700,000 requests under the law, released
information either in full or in part 55 percent of the time, denied
over 38,000 requests, and reported a backlog of over 150,000
requests.70 Clearly the thirst for information shows no sign of
subsiding in the near future.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the fight for codified access to government
records at the federal level began in earnest in the early 1950s with a
handful of open records advocates led by California congressman
John Moss. The Freedom of Information Act, signed into law by
Lyndon Johnson in 1965, opened the door to a new era of citizen
access to government information. The early years saw a barrage of
requests for information, mostly from businesses and corporations
who sought to improve their competitive status in the marketplace.
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Yet, despite congressional intent and the attorney general’s directive
that agencies embrace a new culture of openness, the government
retrenched and actually began using the law as a tool for
nondisclosure. Government agencies were especially prone to hide
behind the executive privilege, trade secrets, internal memoranda,
and investigatory exemptions. Although the courts attempted to
balance the people’s right to know with the government’s need for
secrecy in specific areas, it took a series of amendments to overcome
court decisions that had effectively dismantled significant portions of
the original law. The 1974 amendments strengthened the law, closed
a number of loopholes, and paved the way for an explosion of new
FOIA requests that began almost immediately after passage.
Unfortunately, in the 50 years since the Freedom of Information Act
was first passed, the government’s appetite for secrecy has in many
ways continued unabated. With every new amendment added it
seems that executive agencies and departments find new ways to
avert disclosing their records.
Since its passage, the federal Freedom of Information Act has
influenced state and local open records legislation nationwide.
Although many states had already passed their own laws, the FOIA
inspired others to follow suit, while federal court decisions played an
influential role in how state courts interpreted their own laws. As
experts in the field of record keeping and access, archivists have a
unique perspective in advocating for open records laws at all levels
of government. This is particularly true for federal, state, and
college-level archivists who must work within the confines of these
legislative mandates. While understanding the importance of
confidentiality and exercising profound respect for the individual’s
right to privacy, archivists should continue to engage and promote
legislative remedies to executive overreach. Indeed, in its statement
of core values the Society of American Archivists maintains that,
"although access may be limited in some instances, archivists seek to
promote open access and use when possible. Access to records is
essential . . . and use of records should be both welcomed and
actively promoted."71
As government agencies become ever more secretive, it is
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incumbent upon the archival community to resist this trend. In the
wake of the 1972 FOIA hearings, Representative John Moss
analyzed the differences between democracies and dictatorships. In a
democratic society, he noted, the people hold their leaders
accountable through free elections and a fully informed electorate.
Dictators, with utter contempt for the masses, must control both the
flow of information and the people in order to protect the ruling elite.
"If the few are adroit in their maneuverings — propaganda, secrecy,
distortions, omissions, and outright lies — they can hold the reins of
government" almost indefinitely, Moss contended. "A democracy
without a free and truthful flow of information from government to
its people is nothing more than an elected dictatorship. We can never
permit this to happen in America."72
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